# EU and NATO membership support in Georgia, 2009–2024: what the Caucasus Barometer shows *Produced 2026-10-03 by running Prompt 5 of `../04-survey-synthesis.sequence.md` on `2026-10-03-survey-synthesis-inputs.md` and on nothing else. All percentages are CRRC's published weighted figures, rounded to integers; differences between percentages are in percentage points (pp).* ## Overview In the 2024 Caucasus Barometer, 48% of adults in Georgia said they fully support the country's membership in the European Union and a further 22% rather support it — 70% combined, against 10% who rather or fully oppose it and 5% who did not answer. Combined support for NATO membership in the same wave was 57%, which puts the two series 13 pp apart: in the nine waves that carry both questions, the gap had never exceeded 7 pp, and in 2019 and 2020 it was 2 pp. Both series moved the same way since 2021 — "fully support" up, "rather support" down, outright opposition up — but only the EU series gained on balance, recovering to 70% from 63% while NATO slipped from 60% to 57%. The sharpest internal divide is by age: 58% of 18–34-year-olds fully support EU membership against 43% of those aged 55 and over. ## Key figures 2024 distribution (EUSUPP): fully support 48%, rather support 22%, partially support / partially don't 14%, rather not support 5%, don't support at all 5%, DK/RA 5%. | Wave | Fully | Rather | Partial | Rather not | Not at all | DK/RA | Support sum | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | 2011 | 39 | 30 | 13 | 2 | 3 | 13 | 69 | | 2012 | 38 | 34 | 13 | 2 | 1 | 12 | 72 | | 2013 | 34 | 31 | 17 | 4 | 4 | 10 | 65 | | 2015 | 18 | 24 | 27 | 8 | 8 | 15 | 42 | | 2017 | 17 | 28 | 28 | 6 | 8 | 13 | 45 | | 2019 | 24 | 28 | 25 | 4 | 5 | 13 | 52 | | 2020 | 41 | 32 | 11 | 3 | 4 | 10 | 73 | | 2021 | 34 | 29 | 20 | 4 | 3 | 10 | 63 | | 2024 | 48 | 22 | 14 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 70 | Lowest combined support: 2015 (42%). Highest: 2020 (73%); 2024, at 70%, is the third-highest reading in the series, behind 2020 and 2012 (72%), and 1 pp above the first wave with the question (69% in 2011). What changed between 2021 and 2024 is the shape of that support, not only its level. "Fully support" rose 14 pp, from 34% to 48% — its highest reading in the series, 7 pp above the 2020 peak and 9 pp above 2011 — while "rather support" fell 7 pp to 22%, its lowest reading in the series, and the middle category fell 6 pp to 14%. Opposition rose from 7% to 10% and non-response fell from 10% to 5%, the lowest in the series (it was 15% in 2015). The 2024 wave therefore holds both the series' strongest endorsement and more respondents willing to state an outright position, in either direction, than any wave before it. ## Breakdown by age, 2024 | Age group | Not at all | Rather not | Partially | Rather support | Fully support | DK/RA | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | 18–34 | 4 | 5 | 14 | 16 | 58 | 3 | | 35–54 | 5 | 5 | 15 | 26 | 46 | 3 | | 55+ | 6 | 4 | 14 | 23 | 43 | 10 | Full support is highest among 18–34-year-olds (58%), 12 pp above the 35–54 group (46%) and 15 pp above those aged 55 and over (43%). Combined support narrows that distance to 8 pp — 74% among 18–34, 72% among 35–54, 66% among 55+ — because older respondents more often pick "rather support" (23–26% against 16%). Opposition is flat across the three groups at 9–10%, so the age difference in this cross-tabulation is about intensity and about answering at all, not about opposition: non-response is 10% among the 55+ group against 3% in both younger groups, and that 7 pp accounts for most of the gap in combined support. ## Comparison: NATO membership | Wave | Fully | Rather | Partial | Rather not | Not at all | DK/RA | Support sum | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | 2009 | 29 | 30 | 19 | 5 | 5 | 13 | 59 | | 2010 | 35 | 35 | 13 | 4 | 4 | 10 | 70 | | 2011 | 38 | 28 | 15 | 3 | 4 | 12 | 66 | | 2012 | 34 | 33 | 14 | 3 | 3 | 13 | 67 | | 2013 | 29 | 29 | 19 | 5 | 7 | 11 | 58 | | 2015 | 17 | 21 | 27 | 10 | 10 | 15 | 38 | | 2017 | 16 | 25 | 26 | 8 | 12 | 13 | 41 | | 2019 | 24 | 26 | 23 | 7 | 7 | 13 | 50 | | 2020 | 42 | 29 | 12 | 3 | 4 | 10 | 71 | | 2021 | 31 | 29 | 20 | 5 | 5 | 11 | 60 | | 2024 | 37 | 20 | 18 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 57 | The NATO question runs two waves longer than the EU question, from 2009. For most of the record the two series move together and close: both peak in 2010–2012 and again in 2020, both bottom out in 2015 (38% NATO against 42% EU), both recover from 2017, and in every one of the nine waves that carry both questions NATO support is the lower of the two — by 2 pp in 2019 and 2020, by 3 pp in 2011 and 2021, and by no more than 7 pp (2013) until this wave. In 2024 they separate: EU support rose 7 pp from 2021 while NATO support fell 3 pp, opening a 13 pp gap, the widest in the record. The internal movement is the same in both series — "fully support" up (NATO +6 pp, to 37%), "rather support" down (NATO −9 pp, to 20%, its lowest reading) — but on the NATO question outright opposition rose from 10% to 16%, where on the EU question it rose from 7% to 10%. These are distributions from two questions in the same questionnaire; nothing here identifies a cause for either path. ## Methodology Caucasus Barometer 2024 Georgia: 1,509 completed face-to-face CAPI interviews, 16 April to 13 May 2024, adults aged 18 and over, excluding populations living in territories affected by military conflict (South Ossetia and Abkhazia). Multi-stage stratified cluster sample: electoral precincts as primary sampling units from 2020 parliamentary election frames, allocated to three strata (capital cities, other urban, rural), urban and rural strata further split into four geographic quadrants; PSUs drawn probability-proportional-to-size, households by random walk from a predefined starting point, direction and step size, and the respondent within the household by Kish grid with no replacement. Sample size was calculated independently at a 95% confidence level for each stratum. Interviews were conducted in Georgian (89.8%), Azerbaijani (8.7%) and Armenian (1.5%); minimum response rate (AAPOR RR1) 23%; 1,224 interviews were completed at first contact, 238 on a second attempt and 47 on a third, and CRRC-Georgia re-checked 10% of them face-to-face after fieldwork. Weights adjust for selection probability (from precinct-level voter numbers) and for non-response, then post-stratify by gender, age and geography against the 2014 National Census of Georgia. **The methodological report states no margin of error** — it names a "targeted margin of error" only as one input to the sample size — so differences of 1–2 pp in this note should not be read as changes. The 2024 Georgian wave was self-funded by CRRC-Georgia; the survey has been supported since its inception by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Earlier waves were fielded in the year of the dataset name, and the 2015, 2017, 2019, 2021 and 2024 waves covered Armenia and Georgia only. Question wording and answer labels changed over the run, which matters for any comparison across waves. The EU question was "Please tell me to what extent would you support Georgia's membership in the European Union?" in 2011–2012, "To what extent would you support Georgia's membership in the EU?" in 2013 and 2015, an explicit 1-to-5 scale in 2017, 2019, 2021 and 2024, and in 2020 a read-out variant listing the six answers in the question itself. The NATO question was asked without a scale read out in 2009–2015, with the 1-to-5 scale from 2017, and in the same read-out variant in 2020. The middle category is labelled "Equally support and don't support" in 2011–2015 and "Partially support, partially don't support" from 2017; in 2009 and 2010 the three middle NATO categories are printed as the bare codes 2, 3 and 4. "Don't know" and "Refuse to answer" are reported as one cell in some waves and separately in others, and the 2013 NATO page prints a DK row with no RA row at all. All figures are CRRC's published weighted percentages. ## Sources - The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2011, 2012, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2024) "Caucasus Barometer", Georgia — variable EUSUPP; (2009, 2010 and the same waves) — variable NATOSUPP; (2024) EUSUPP by AGEGROUP. Retrieved from http://www.caucasusbarometer.org/ on 3 October 2026 — pages `https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cbge/EUSUPP/`, `.../NATOSUPP/` and `https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2024ge/EUSUPP-by-AGEGROUP/`. - CRRC-Georgia, "Caucasus Barometer 2024 Georgia — Methodological Report", June 2024, and the survey factsheet — https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2024ge/downloads/ and https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2024ge/factsheet/, accessed 3 October 2026. CHECK: every number above appears in my printed tables — yes.